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UNDERSTANDING THE REGULATORY ACTIVITIES OF 
THE HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATOR IN NIGERIA 
Nnedinma Umeokafor86 and David Isaac 
Department of Built Environment, Faculty of Architecture, Computing & Humanities, University of Greenwich, 
London, UK.
The lack of health and safety (H&S) regulation in Nigeria is one of the main factors blamed 
for the challenging state of H&S in Nigeria. This highlights the activities of the custodian of 
H&S, the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Labour and Productivity Inspectorate Division (LPID). 
This study examined the regulatory activities of LPID and developed a content framework of 
recommendations for improving the regulation of H&S in Nigeria. The work includes a review 
of literature and analysis of documents collected from the LPID in addition to interviewing 14 
members of staff of LPID. The results reveal that the regulatory activities of LPID are based 
on deterrence theory. These activities such as the accident reporting and post-accident 
investigation procedures, proactive measures are evidenced as poor, adducing the position of 
the critics of LPID. Albeit, factors such as logistics, political influence, and inadequate 
legislation may hinder the regulatory activities of LPID, LPID can do more to improve the 
regulatory activities. It is thus recommended that while LPID sparingly engages in negative 
publicity as a means of reputation management, positive publicity strategies are worth 
adopting. 
Keywords: health and safety, Nigeria, regulatory activities.
INTRODUCTION
Although it is axiomatic that health and safety (H&S) in Nigeria is poor, evidence from the literature 
shows that conditions are not improving (for example see: Ezenwa 2001; Okokon et al. 2014; 
Umeokafor et al. 2014a). Typically, Umeokafor et al. (2014a) report that 49.5% of the 93 reported 
injuries during 2002 – 2012 (11 years) were fatal. This shows an increase over time, as an earlier 
study (Ezenwa 2001) reports that 2.2% of the 3189 injuries reported from 1987 to 1996 were fatal. 
Analogously, in a case study that covers a period of 12 months, Okokon et al. (2014) also report a 
Crude Incident Rate (CIR) of 163.4 injuries per 1000 workers with regard to work-related traumatic 
injuries. 
Adequate regulation is pertinent in improving H&S. Sadly, the dilapidating state of H&S in the 
country is blamed on inadequate regulation (Idubor & Oisamoje 2013), throwing the spotlight on the 
activities of the Federal Ministry of Labour and Productivity Inspectorate Division (LPID) the 
custodian of H&S in Nigeria and perhaps its regulatory approach. In particular, much of the regulation 
of H&S in Nigeria as suggested by literature is based on the deterrence approach, specifically 
command and control (Factories Act 2004; Umeokafor et al. 2014a), but enforcement, which is a core 
aspect of command and control, is demonstrated as poor in studies (Umeokafor et al. 2014a). 
In response, evidence from the literature suggests that LPID acknowledges its inability to perform as 
expected (Akpan 2013). However, LPID blames inadequate legislation, political influence, restricted 
number of employees and the existing H&S regulatory approach in Nigeria as defining factors 
Proceedings of CIB W099 
Benefitting Workers and Society through Inherently Safe(r) Construction
Belfast, Northern Ireland, 10-11 September 2015
Return to TOC                                                               488
86 nnedinmaik@hotmail.com; un08@gre.ac.uk
responsible for the poor performance of H&S and LPID in Nigeria (Akpan 2013; Umeokafor et al. 
2014b). It is vital to note that the deterrence regulatory strategy (which LPID adopts) is criticised in 
studies (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992; Aalders &Willthagen 1997) for its downsides, which has 
prompted a move to other regulatory approaches (Hutter & Amodu 2008). It is asked at this point if 
the regulatory activities of the LPID, the regulatory approach or the contextual factors account(s) for 
the dilapidating state of H&S in Nigeria. It is, however, possible that all above or two account for the 
dilapidating state of H&S in Nigeria.
To advance this study, it is thought that as the problems relating to improving H&S in Nigeria are 
arguably complex, it is therefore naive to solely blame the regulator. Therefore, investigating the 
activities of LPID is coherent and can be a starting point. After all, views hold that efforts towards 
improving H&S in Nigeria are mainly based on regulation (Diugwu et al. 2013), and this is evidenced 
as poor. It is also thought that understanding the regulatory process of LPID will also involve 
examining its regulatory approach, and this may also highlight the contextual influences. This will 
then inform the development of a framework of recommendations for improving the regulation of 
H&S at the public entity level, which this study also seeks to do.
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION
The regulation of H&S is the process of developing or adopting and administering policies and/or 
standards that are based on ensuring the safety, health and welfare of people at work or those that will 
be directly or indirectly affected by workplace activities. Regulation can be at the state/public or 
private level. This paper focuses on state/public regulation. 
Regulatory activities 
Literature shows that regulation can be based on activities not limited to: setting and/or developing 
policies or standards, monitoring of regulatory process (Garcia Martinez et al. 2007), and enforcement 
of regulatory policies and/or standards (Winter & May 2001). There can also be reputation 
management, which involves the naming and shaming of organisations with poor H&S records 
(Fairman & Yapp 2005; Garcia Martinez et al. 2007) or promoting the image of organisations with 
good H&S records (Diugwu 2008). These can be done via social media such as Facebook. Regulation 
can also involve: providing information and educating the regulated (Fairman & Yapp 2005; Hutter & 
Amodu 2008). Again, the use of social media can be adopted at this stage. Inspections to ensure 
compliance (Fairman & Yapp 2005), targeted enforcement where resources are focused on repeated 
offenders (Hutter & Amodu 2008) and negotiation (Fairman & Yapp 2005) are also regulatory 
activities. 
Deterrence theory
Regulation can be centred on theories such as deterrence theory, specifically command and control. 
According to Akers (1990) deterrence theory ‘… assumes that human actions are based on "rational" 
decisions - that is, they are informed by the probable consequences of that action’ (p 654).  Therefore, 
under this theory, crimes can be prevented if the zeal to commit a crime is counterbalanced by the 
consequences such as punishment (Akers 1990). This is of course given that offenders are rational 
actors (Akers 1990). Hence, this depends on: people making logical decisions prior to committing a 
crime; the severity of the punishment; people knowing the likelihood that they will be caught. 
However, the perceived reward for committing a crime may exceed the assumed punishment thus the 
zeal to commit a crime may be sustained. So it is possible to argue that deterrence theory is about risk 
versus reward. 
Basically, deterrence theory is based on preventing people from committing crimes with the use of 
punitive measures or threats. 
Given the above premise, deterrence theory is advanced in the context of this study. Deterrence theory 
assumes that firms comply with legislation if the probability of being apprehended (p) and the cost of 
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being caught (D) exceed the benefits of non-compliance (U): U< PD (Fairman & Yapp 2005; Tombs 
& Whyte 2013). This usually entails adopting measures such as command and control (Tombs & 
Whyte 2013), involving fines and sanctions. 
Consequently, deterrence theory implies that the regulated will comply with H&S laws for fear of 
sanctions or threats. Also, it assumes that sanctions will make offenders less likely to reoffend. Thus, 
the punitive damage for violating H&S law should be severe enough to dissuade the regulated from 
violating the law or from reoffending. Further, deterrence theory also implies that to achieve 
compliance, the likelihood of the regulated being caught should be high; thus, the regulated does not 
have a perfect knowledge of being caught or not (Tom & Whyte 2013). But, this puts both financial 
and resources burden on the regulator. Deterrence theory also assumes that compliance is a rational 
behaviour (Fairman & Yapp 2005); thus, the regulated is a rational actor. However, in reality the 
above may not always the case. 
For example, in Nigeria, fines for breaching H&S legislation are as low as 1000 Naira (equivalent to 
US $5) (Factories Act 2004). Also, the likelihood of offenders being caught is low because the 
regulation of H&S is inadequate. Even if the regulated is caught, the likelihood of being prosecuted 
by LPID is low because of corruption and a dysfunctional legal system. Therefore, the regulated have 
a perfect image of the risk, believing that the reward for non-compliance outweighs the risk. As a 
consequence, under deterrence theory, the regulated in Nigeria will not comply with the law.  
The debate on deterrence-based regulatory strategies 
Regulatory strategies based solely on the deterrence theory have been criticised for reasons not 
limited to the following. First, deterrence strategy (command and control) sees the regulatory business 
as a two-party affair in that the regulatory agency and the firm are the only determinants to 
compliance (see Ayres & Braithwaite 1992). However, Ayres & Braithwaite (1992) argue that there 
are prosecutors and committee of legislators in the camp of the regulatory authority; and the industry, 
employees and trade unions on the side of the firm. Thus, it is an over- simplification to consider only 
the firm and the regulatory agency (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992). Second, deterrence-based strategies 
can be costly (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992). Third, it is also not consistent with current practices, and 
it is a barrier to innovation (Aalders & Willthagen 1997). Consequently, there has been a move away 
from command and control to more flexible and tolerant regulatory approaches (Aalders & 
Willthagen 1997; Hutter & Amodu 2008). 
In contrast, studies such as Tombs and Whyte (2013) and Baldwin and Black (2007) contend the 
above points against deterrence-based strategies. In particular, Tombs and Whyte (2013) believe that 
the move away is underpinned by political motives. They maintain that the move away is pseudo as 
scholars still appreciate deterrence-based strategies (Tombs & Whyte 2013). 
Regulation of health and safety in Nigeria  
LPID is empowered by the Factories Act F1 LFN 2004 (the H&S legislation in Nigeria) to oversee 
H&S in Nigeria. A review of the Factories Act 2004 shows that the regulation of H&S in Nigeria is 
based on state regulation, which is centred on deterrence theory.
The background established so far may justify or evidence why authors (Idubor & Osiamoje, 2013; 
Umeokafor et al. 2014a) blame LPID for the poor regulation of H&S in Nigeria. However, views 
from authors arguably contend the aforesaid, thus tending to exonerate the LPID from criticisms and 
putting the blame on contextual factors or the H&S regulatory strategy in Nigeria. To explain, 
whereas the regulatory approach of LPID (which is deterrence-based) is usually costly, resource 
intensive and needs punitive laws to achieve compliance, studies note that the LPID is hindered by 
factors such as lack of funds, low person power  (Akpan 2013; Idubor & Osiamoje 2013), 
dysfunctional legal system, and inadequate legislation. It is then asked at this point: is it the LPID or 
its regulatory system, which is determined by the Factories Act (thus beyond the powers of LPID) or 
contextual factors that is to be blamed for the poor regulation of H&S in Nigeria?
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METHODS
Documentary information obtained from LPID (e.g., accident reports and enforcement reports from 
2002 to 2012, intervention policies) was reviewed. This was followed by face-to-face semi-structured 
interviews of fourteen staff of LPID through purposeful sampling. The sampling covered employees 
with over two years experience, as it is believed that they will provide substantial information. As at 
early 2014, only forty-nine employees of LPID had the required number of years of experience (cf. 
Akpan 2013; Okojie 2010). The saturation point was attained prior to interviewing the eleventh 
interviewee. This is consistent with Guest et al. (2006) who found that the saturation point could be 
reached on interviewing the first twelve respondents. The interviewees represent the three levels in the 
ministry thus: top management, factory inspectors, and controller/administrators. The themes for the 
interviews emerged from the literature and document review and were piloted on three H&S 
inspectors. The themes formed the interview guide and are presented below. The interview guide of 
this study was in two parts thus: part one covered the personal information of the respondents; part 
two examined the regulatory activities of LPID. The result of the document analysis and interviews 
are presented in narratives and quotations below.
RESULTS
Regulatory foundation
The document review showed that the regulation of H&S in Nigeria is mostly based on command and 
control approach (inspection to be precise). Document review also showed that the LPID relies mostly 
on accident reporting as a driver for inspection in this regulatory approach, thus reactive intervention. 
However, while evidence from the interviews supports the aforesaid, there is also contradicting 
evidence. For instance, one of the respondents stated:
‘The regulatory framework deals with the formulation of a national policy of H&S … the 
legislative acts (the Factory Act), which is incurred through a legislative process for 
acceptability hence popular compliance is expected. Thereafter, we have regulations (i.e. 
product of an Act) and codes of practice. Regulations (i.e. product of an Act) will explain the 
intent of the act. And then by ILO advice or standard or expectation, the factory inspector is 
supposed to be a consultant that is why we in the Ministry of Labour talk about administration 
of the law essentially rather than enforcement. Administration goes beyond enforcement’. Also, 
‘The minister is given the power to make regulations (i.e. product of an Act) and they are 
supposed to assist in making the intents of the acts to be easily implementable’.  
Accident reporting, investigation and post-investigation actions
Accident reporting
From the documents reviewed, it is evident that the LPID has offices in all the 36 states of Nigeria 
and all accidents are reported to the Director of LPID who then decides on the next course of action. 
Furthermore, from the documents reviewed, it is revealed that the LPID has procedures in place for 
accident reporting, but these may not be robust. However, some external bodies that work with the 
LPID can hinder their services. For instance, there is a record of a case where the police produced the 
autopsy report of a victim six months after the accident. This does not help LPID in its activities.
Accident investigation  
The documents reviewed also showed that while some of the accidents reported to the LPID were 
investigated within 24 hours, some were investigated up to five months after reporting. In a particular 
case, the investigation was conducted after the case was published in the newspaper, which was three 
months after the incident. Of course, the investigation will be based on the little evidence left (that is 
if any is left). 
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Further, the process of investigation is mostly based on interviewing which appears to be robust. 
However, there were cases where forensic examination may have been adequate, but no records have 
been found. 
Post-accident investigation actions
In terms of post-accident investigation actions, having noted that all accidents in Nigeria are reported 
to the Director of LPID who decides on what next to do, it vital to note that only the Director can 
authorise the issuance of prohibition notices - closing down premises. The interviews even elaborate 
that closing down premises takes longer, starting from sending cautionary letters until it gets to the 
last stage of closing down.  In particular, one of the respondents stated that: 
‘Enforcement is done after education of stakeholders, assisting and supporting them to comply 
with the laws’.
Also, while the LPID is found to issue warning letters and has prosecuted some violators, the numbers 
of punitive measures were small compared to the number of violations. However, LPID also 
complements the punitive measures with reputation management, which is negative publicity. Again, 
evidence shows that negative publicity is done once in a while; this is induced by accidents, not poor 
H&S practices.
Proactive regulatory measures 
Majority of the respondents stated that they conduct proactive inspections of workplaces once or 
twice a year and this depends on the level of risk in the workplace. Although there was documentary 
evidence of impromptu inspections, they were not carried out frequently. Also, the extent to which 
LPID achieves the ‘one or two inspections’ for each company is questionable, as some respondents 
said that they do not achieve that because of lack of person power. Worse still, the available person 
power may be under utilised in that one respondent stated: 
‘Honestly, since I have been here, I have not covered any accident, inspection or anything 
similar’. 
 Nonetheless, the document review also suggested that the LPID acknowledges the inability of their 
enforcement procedures to create the expected impact in terms of improving H&S. 
Another significant aspect of the interviews is that, while the respondents at management level 
claimed to have procedures in place for educating stakeholders, the respondents at the non-managerial 
levels claimed otherwise. For example, one of the respondents at non-managerial level stated:
 ‘How can they (that is LPID) educate stakeholders while we (the employees) do not get 
training?’ 
The contrary claim of the respondents at the non-managerial level is arguably supported by the fact 
that no evidence of educating stakeholders was found during documentation review. 
Proactive regulation through cooperating with the management of organisations
Employee participation: it is also evident from the interviews that LPID understands the importance 
of employees’ involvement; thus, they encourage the formation of safety committees. This is despite 
the fact that it is not obligatory in the H&S legislation. A respondent stated: 
‘There are things that we make compulsory such as safety committee and safety management 
control system, but we do not make risk assessment compulsory. The safety committee helps in 
ensuring employee involvement in safety matters. It gives employees a sense of belonging’.
The respondents were then asked why risk assessment is not compulsory. Answers from the 
respondents suggest that they believe that organisations may duplicate risk assessments from other 
organisations just to fulfil the requirement.  
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Barriers to effective regulation of health and safety
When the respondents were asked of the challenges that they encounter while performing their duties, 
most of their answers were based on logistics such as limited internet access, inadequate 
transportation. Indeed, the respondents stated as follows: 
‘We just have one inspection vehicle in this state office, and we are about 41. To crown it all, 
most times there is no petrol for the vehicle’.
‘We do not have any vehicle here. Most time, we use public transport or we use our own 
vehicles’.
‘There is not enough tools for working. Can you imagine that some employees here have never 
seen a sound meter because we do not have it?’ 
‘We are not provided with adequate funds, up to the extent that we cannot post letters that we 
type with our old typewriters because of no money’.
Other barriers highlighted by the respondents include: lack of training, ineffective means of 
communication, low level of knowledge, inadequate means of reporting accidents, political influence, 
inadequate legal system and lack of manpower. One respondent stated:
 ‘Some of our colleagues at branch level have not received any training since they joined this 
organisation. Only those at the headquarters enjoy the benefits of working for this ministry’. 
Another significant barrier is inadequate legislation. The respondents stated that the penalties for 
violating the H&S legislation were not punitive enough. They also want to see more prescriptive 
legislation so as to improve the level of compliance, as prescriptive legislation is easily understood. 
Truly, some respondents stated:
‘The law is vague; we now make regulations (i.e. product of an act) that prescribe the standards 
so that they can be easily enforced. When the law is vague, the regulated can easily argue it 
out’.
‘Prescriptive regulations (i.e. product of an act) are better understood because they are broken 
down to the level that the users can easily interpret them’. 
This barrier of inadequate legislation is also supported by evidence from the document review. The 
inspectors also claim that as a result of inadequate legislation, they have developed an alternative 
measure. One respondent stated: 
We tell the companies to have something like safety handbooks for their workers, which contain 
safety rules and regulations (i.e. requirements). These handbooks are designed based on the 
duties of employees. If the employees fail to comply with these rules and regulations (i.e. 
requirements), their jobs are at risk. These handbooks are supported and signed into force by 
the managements of organisations and/or unions. The aim is to scare the employees.’
The validity of the above claim remains questioned, as no documented evidence was found in that 
regard.
DISCUSSION
Regulatory foundation 
Although LPID claims to focus on administration of the law, no evidence was found to support this. 
Rather sufficient evidence points to LPID focusing on (command and control) enforcement of the law. 
Considering the arguments against command and control in this paper, the position of Nigeria in terms 
of regulation of H&S is not surprising. The underpinning philosophy of deterrence theory that 
command and control is based on and its challenges may explain why compliance with the H&S law 
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is poor in Nigeria. The equation above (U< PD) means that for organisations to comply, they will 
calculate the cost of being caught. And as Fairman and Yapp note, it is hard to calculate (2005). This 
is especially true in H&S where the direct and indirect costs are hard, if not impossible to measure 
(Manu 2012). Thus, the regulated may assume that it is rewarding not to comply. Also, as it is more 
unlikely that LPID will enforce the law, the likelihood that offenders will be caught is low. Therefore, 
the regulated may have complete knowledge of the possibility of being caught or not (Fairman & 
Yapp 2005; Tomb & Whyte 2013) thus may not comply with the law.
Additionally, considering the points against deterrence theory and the challenges that LPID faces, it is 
not prudent that regulation is solely based on command and control. Besides, the state of H&S in 
Nigeria demonstrates the inefficiency of this approach. The state of H&S intervention in Nigeria is 
presented in Umeokafor et al. (2014a) who note the low level of punitive enforcement activities in 
Nigeria covering an eleven-year period. Specifically, they note that over an eleven-year period, ten 
precautions and one recorded criminal prosecution were carried out (Umeokafor et al. 2014a). 
Umeokafor et al. (2014a) also go on to evidence the lower number of interventions that are adopted in 
Nigeria; this is consistent with the responses of the interviewees. This is also consistent with Okojie 
(2010) who notes that prohibition notices are hardly issued in Nigeria. Nigeria should move from 
command and control approach to other forms of self-regulation and/or partnering strategy.
Accident reporting, investigation and post-investigation actions
Having only the Director of LPID authorise the issuance of prohibition notices has been 
reported and criticised by Umeokafor et al. (2014b), and the long process that it takes does 
not help H&S in Nigeria. 
Additionally, accident reporting and investigation are among the critical aspects of H&S management 
and regulation, but the evidence in this study does not speak well of LPID. The fact that it can take 
LPID up to five months to investigate incidents leaves the quality or outcome of the investigation 
questionable. It is possible that LPID can blame this on the ineffective accident reporting system, but 
it is their responsibility to ensure that the accident reporting system is effective.
Equally, considering the accident reporting method in Nigeria and the high level of bureaucracy, other 
ways of reporting accidents, which are social media friendly, should be considered. Advanced 
methods of investigating accidents cover the chain of events leading to the accidents, investigating the 
parties indirectly involved. Sadly, no record of such was found during the study.      
In terms of reputation management, it is evident that LPID sparingly engages in negative publicity 
(induced by accidents) as a means of reputation management. While this may be good, negative 
publicity induced by accidents may mean that casualties or damages to properties may have occurred. 
However, if the negative publicity is induced by findings of proactive inspections such as H&S 
practices, the casualties or damages to properties may be prevented. 
Furthermore, the use of negative publicity by LPID may have greater effect on large organisations 
than on small and medium enterprises (SMEs), as it is found that large firms fear negative publicity 
more than the law (Fisse & Braithwaite 1993 in Amodu 2008). Therefore a positive approach to 
reputation management- positive publicity as Diugwu (2008) argues, may be more effective on these 
firms. This is because large firms and SMEs may engage in H&S so that people will view them from 
a positive light. As stated earlier, the use of social media can be helpful for positive and negative 
publicity and for educating the regulated.
Proactive regulatory measures
While the legislative process of H&S in Nigeria may be argued to be acceptable to some extent, the 
intervention approaches that are informed by accident reporting are not adequate. As much as 
command and control may not be efficient as enforced self-regulatory approaches, proactive 
inspections will deter organisations more than the reactive approaches. Sadly, evidence shows that 
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few proactive inspections are conducted. Howard and Galbraith (2004) discuss the importance of 
proactive deterrence strategies in detail. 
However, the low person power may account for the low number of inspections. There were 49 
inspectors prior to 2013 when more inspectors were employed making it a little over 200 (Akpan 
2013; cf. Okojie 2010). The number of inspectors compared to the population of Nigeria is 
insufficient. As this is the case, partnering or involving other authorities (Howard & Galbraith 2004) 
with larger manpower may be helpful. The educational regulatory approach can also complement the 
existing strategy in Nigeria. It is best practice to provide education to ensure compliance (see Fairman 
& Yapp 2005).
Proactive regulation through cooperating with the management of organisations
In terms of employee participation, that LPID encourages the establishment of safety committees as 
well as cooperation between employees and employers (Walters et al. 2005) in H&S matters offers 
some level of optimism. However, the input of trade unions may also be needed for improving H&S 
(Idubor & Osiamoje 2013), as their influence on workers cannot be overemphasised. It is therefore 
vital to note that to achieve the above and more, there are preconditions such as legislative influence, 
inspection and control, and senior management commitment (Walter et al. 2005). 
On a different point, that the LPID is found not to make risk assessment compulsory is not best 
practice. This raises questions regarding the quality of H&S management in the organisations and the 
quality of the regulatory activities that LPID offers. Risk assessment helps in avoiding, eliminating or 
reducing risks in the workplace.
Barriers to effective regulation of health and safety
In terms of the challenges that the LPID encounters, most of these are acknowledged in studies. For 
instance, Okojie (2010) notes that political influence is seen to highly influence the regulation of H&S 
in Nigeria. She goes on to note that LPID inspectors are not able to close down firms that violate H&S 
laws because their owners are politicians or people in the higher echelon of power (Okojie 2010). 
Equally, logistics issues (such as lack of vehicles, lack of equipment), which majority of the 
respondents acknowledge are consistent with Akpan (2013). It is unclear if these logistics issues are 
due lack of funds caused by inadequate governmental attention or due to corrupt practices from the 
part of LPID or due to poor management. Be it as it may, these issues can be argued to significantly 
hinder the activities of LPID.
Additionally, the inadequate legislation and ineffective legal system that are found in this study are 
also reported in studies (Idubor & Osiamoje 2013; Umeokafor et al. 2014a). This does not support the 
deterrence theory-based regulatory approach in Nigeria.  It is worth remembering that the underlying 
philosophy of sanction-based deterrence strategy is that punitive measures will hinder people from 
breaching the law. As the penalties of H&S laws such as the Factories Act F1 LFN 2004 is as low as 
2000 Naira (equivalent to US $10) and 5000 naira (equivalent to US $24.9) (Factories Act 2004: 
section 3 subsection 4; section 20 subsection 2), sanction based regulatory strategies may not be 
effective. According to Umeokafor et al. (2014a), the regulated would rather breach the law and pay 
the fine than comply. Nonetheless, it is thought that despite the barriers to effective regulation or the 
impact of contextual issues, LPID can do more to improve H&S in Nigeria.
Furthermore, from the interviews it can be seen that LPID has the powers to make regulations 
(i.e products of an Act), and the Factories Act F1 LFN 2004 supports this. Although LPID 
claims to make regulations (i.e. product of an Act) in order to make the Factories Act 
clearer, what remains unclear is why LPID would not make regulations (i.e. product of an 
Act) to address the anomalies of the Factories Act. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This paper reports a study based on document review and semi-structured interviews that has aimed at  
understanding the regulatory activities of the LPID so as to develop a framework of recommendations 
for improving regulation of H&S at the public entity level. This study evidences that the regulation of 
H&S in Nigeria is based on the command and control approach, and LPID relies on inspections 
induced by reported accidents. Worse still, this accident reporting system and other regulatory 
activities are evidenced in this study as poor, strengthening the positions of the critics of LPID. Also, 
albeit logistics, weak legal system, inadequate legislation and lack of person power are found to be 
among the factors that hinder the regulation of H&S, more can be done by LPID to improve H&S in 
Nigeria.
Against the background of this study, the following are recommended:  
• The deterrence approach of the LPID should be more proactive. Given the current 
state of H&S in Nigeria, LPID can have educational and information strategies in 
the forefront of regulating H&S.   
• In the absence of an efficient legal system, LPID can adopt mobile courts in a 
similar form to that of the Federal Road Safety Commission of Nigeria. The 
mobile courts may have the powers to handle some minor offences.
• It is advocated that LPID should adopt positive publicity reputation management 
in regulation H&S.
• Involving local authorities in H&S regulation as it is done in the UK (Howard & 
Galbraith 2004) can be another way that LPID can improve H&S in Nigeria. 
• LPID can partner with organisations such as safety groups just as local authorities 
have successfully done in the UK (Howard & Galbraith 2004). This supports 
regulators who have limited resources. The partnership may not only be 
enforcement related but educational and creating awareness.
• LPID can adopt social media such as Facebook for passing H&S information. 
Social networking remains an effective way of passing information in Nigeria.
• LPID should adopt an accident reporting system where the victims or witnesses 
also report accident directly to LPID. This system should be accessible through 
the social media.
• Given that there are anomalies in the Factories Act F1 LFN 2004, the LPID should 
utilise the power bestowed on it by the Factories Act F1 LFN 2004 and make 
regulations (i.e. product of an Act) and code of practices to address the anomalies 
in the Factories Act F1 LFN 2004. 
This study faced its own limitations. First, the interviewees may have been those that could provide 
answers that will not negatively impact on LPID so much. Second, it may be argued that the findings 
of this study are obvious; however, the study is an empirical evidence that validates the critiques of 
LPID. Besides, no or little evidence of such has been found. Further studies can examine involving 
local authorities in H&S regulation and using social media in H&S regulation. 
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